Weak-imperialist Powers - The Process of Assimilation into the Structure of World Imperialism

Weak-imperialist Powers - The Process of Assimilation into the Structure of World Imperialism

(Preface: The following piece by an ICFI (1953) supporter is posted for thought/discussion among readers. The positions herein are not necessarily endorsed.) 

The course of the Russo-Ukraine war - primarily provoked by Western imperialism - confirms the analysis that Russia has been waging a reactionary war aimed only at reaching a deal with imperialism. It is not directed against imperialism itself, nor at resisting Ukraine's violations of the rights of Russian speakers in its territory to self-determination (as it claims), but at further integration into world imperialism. Despite massive military advantages against Western imperialism's proxy army in Ukraine, Russia has found itself - for years - bogged down in a destructive war of attrition entailing a complete waste of human life and material, the violation of Ukrainians' right to self-determination, and the conquest of some 20% of what was formerly Ukrainian territory.

The longer the war has dragged on, the more necessary it has become to clarify its nature, including that of Russia itself. The ICFI describes Russia's reaction as a "predominantly defensive response" to imperialism, but does not support Russia in its conflict with imperialism's proxy in Ukraine. Why? Because, it also tells us, Russia's war is "reactionary" because it is aimed at seeking a "deal with imperialism." What kind of deal? One that entails a "defence of the status quo." But this is a tautology - "Russia's defensive war is reactionary because it is defensive." In a letter endorsed by the IC, we are also told that "there is also [something] missing in the psychological character of the Russian bourgeoisie" and there is "not...any motive to expand...markets." But Marxists do not base their analysis primarily on the psychology and subjective motives of the actors involved, but on the objective logic of world capitalism. The ICFI also cites "reactionary Russian nationalism," but in the era of imperialism, all nation-states have become "reactionary" in general. So is it improper to support any nation in any conflict? This generality could be used to obliterate all dialectical concreteness involved in the Marxist attitude towards specific wars (eg. that between Israel and Palestine, where the ICFI, despite labelling Hamas' nationalism as "fundamentally reactionary" in earlier years, takes the opposite track and gives backhanded support to Hamas.)

At the same time, the various efforts to categorize Russia as "imperialist" have almost universally suffered a fatal flaw: they analyze Russia in complete isolation, inundating us with various figures (e.g., the extent of Russia's investment abroad, the growth of its multinationals, etc.) There is no real attempt to systematically situate these figures within a world analysis. What we need is a real Marxist analysis.

Until now, it has been necessary to categorize Russia as "non-imperialist." It was clearly differentiated from the major imperialist powers while also standing much closer to, and even to many extents below, other countries of intermediate development, such as China, Chile, Brazil, Poland, etc. However, this category was purely negative - it mostly told us what Russia was not, rather than what it is or where it is going. The more the situation develops, the more it is necessary to designate it with a "positive" category. But one does not switch the categorization of countries within the hierarchy of the world system the way one changes their shirt. It requires a development of theory and a clarification of the processes involved. Is this possible? We hope to take the first steps in that direction and show that it is.

Categories like "sub-imperialist" (subordinate imperialist), "weak imperialist," etc countries have existed for some time on the fringes of the Marxist movement. While we do not necessarily draw from these previous efforts, this piece attempts to frame the rise of new bourgeois powers using such a category - ultimately in our case drawn from Lenin's analysis of Portuguese imperialism in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In that seminal work, Lenin dissected the intricate hierarchies of global capitalist domination, revealing how other states could serve as subordinate parts of a system dominated by the core imperialist metropoles. This passage in particular merits full quotation for its precision and relevance:

"A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually, for more than two hundred years, since the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal and her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France. In return Great Britain has received commercial privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and especially capital into Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc., etc. [10] Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in the epoch of capitalist imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the sum total of “divide the world” relations and become links in the chain of operations of world finance capital."

Without attempting to rip this analysis out of its historical context and impose it on modern situations with very different particular circumstances - including the rise of globalization - this passage still points towards the existence of a different, and subordinate, category of imperialist power, one characterized by systems of eg. "financial" dependence on the major imperialist powers and integration into the "chain of operations of world finance capital." Lenin's insight underscores the complex nature of imperialism: not a monolithic bloc, but a pyramid of exploitation where semi-peripheral formations can both draw sustenance from and extend the tendrils of the core powers. In the contemporary context, at a time when the contradictions of world capitalism are sharpening amid the relative decline of the historic imperialist centers - chief among them the United States, whose hegemonic pretensions mask deepening internal and external decay - and the convulsions of wars, we witness the maturation of this subordinate layer.

This process is not accidental but arises from the inexorable logic of capital accumulation in the age of imperialism. The core powers, facing overproduction crises and the exhaustion of national markets, propel outward expansion through capital export, which in turn fosters bourgeois growth in the peripheries. These emergent elites, far from representing a rupture with imperialism, embody its adaptation: they assimilate advanced productive forces while perpetuating the extraction of surplus value from the most oppressed. The weak-imperialist powers thus function as "links in the chain of operations of world finance capital," as Lenin might have termed them - channeling the imperatives of Wall Street and the City of London into the arteries of countries of historically belated development.

In the modern period, we are witnessing the development of a new system of weak-imperialist powers emerging from the relative decline in the positions of older imperialist powers and following on the backs of the rise of Israel, Taiwan and South Korea as imperialist powers over previous decades. This reconfiguration is evident in the empirical trajectories of select countries: China, Russia, Brazil, and Poland serve as illustrative cases, each at varying rungs of this hierarchy yet united in their role as intermediaries. Countries at various stages in this process (ranging from Russia, China, Brazil, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, etc) sometimes bear marks of under-development, unresolved democratic tasks, or a legacy of previous "Sovietization" (this in particular creating the foundations for some to rise as imperialist powers), alongside advanced technology and function as transmission belts for the remaining (and overwhelming) economic and political pressure of the core imperialist powers. These countries constitute agencies of imperialism among the countries of belated development and maneuver and mediate between the core imperialist powers and less developed countries. They represent the growth of a layer which has reached a stage similar in many ways to that reached by the core imperialist powers some 100+ years ago.

Consider the quantitative dimensions of this assimilation. Foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows, a hallmark of imperialist expansion, have surged in these states, signaling their integration into the circuits of global finance capital. In China, outward FDI stock ballooned from a mere $28 billion in 2000 to approximately $2.9 trillion by 2023, with annual outflows peaking at $196 billion in 2016 before stabilizing at around $147 billion in 2022. This explosive growth, facilitated by state-orchestrated initiatives like the Belt and Road, exemplifies how weak-imperialist powers repurpose accumulated surplus for predatory ventures abroad, often in tandem with Western multinationals. Russia's FDI outflows, though volatile due to geopolitical frictions, reached $70.69 billion in 2013 before contracting to $29.1 billion in 2023 amid sanctions, yet underscoring a persistent drive to secure enclaves in the post-Soviet space and beyond. Brazil's outward FDI stock expanded from approximately $28 billion in 2000 to $366 billion by 2023; these flows predominantly target South American dependencies and African resource cradles, reinforcing Western-orchestrated commodity circuits through state-backed giants like Petrobras. Poland's trajectory, from a modest $268 million stock in 2000 to $38.2 billion in 2023, reflects EU-aligned expansion, funneled into Eastern European logistics and energy footholds that service German and Western European monopolies.

Parallel to this outward thrust is the internal accumulation of bourgeois wealth, as measured by per capita income growth - an indicator of the expanding material base sustaining the weak-imperialist bourgeoisie. China's GDP per capita rocketed from $963 in 2000 to $13,806 in 2025, a massive increase that reflects the general growth of wealth, although consolidated to a great extent in the hands of the ruling strata. Russia's per capita income climbed from $1,898 in 2000 to $17,446 in 2025, expressing economic advance amid oligarchic wealth concentration. Poland's ascent, from $4,499 in 2000 to $28,484 in 2025, underscores increasing integration into EU supply chains. Brazil's per capita income surged some ~200% from 2000 to 2025, a rise that masks deepening divides enriching a narrow oligarchy. These metrics illuminate not progress but the growing abyss between the classes: rising averages atop widening chasms of exploitation.

Compounding this is the consistent growth of monopolies within these economies, an epitome of Lenin's "monopoly stage." In China, monopolies dominate various sectors, with aggregate profits increasingly concentrated, fostering rent-seeking and mirroring the core's financialization. Russia's economy has witnessed a decade-long consolidation, with state policy entrenching oligarchic monopolies in various sectors, where easy profits propel behavior reminiscent of the bourgeoisie in core imperialist countries - with mass amounts of capital as FDI being funneled through conduits like Cyprus. In Brazil, oligopolies in mining and agribusiness - epitomized by Vale's near-monopolies on nickel and iron ore (controlling over 80% of exports) and JBS's dominance in meat processing (world's largest, with 20%+ global share) - entrench rentier capitalism, often intertwined with U.S. agribusiness giants. Banking follows suit, with the top five institutions commanding 75% of assets. Poland's monopolistic tendencies mirror this in energy, where PKN Orlen wields 35% control over fuel refining and distribution, and in insurance via PZU's 30% market stranglehold; copper mining sees KGHM monopolizing 100% of output, channeling into EU-oriented extraction. These tendencies to monopoly are no anomalies but necessary corollaries to weak-imperialist ascent: they both consolidate and result from the consolidation of a bourgeoisie based on a growing accumulation of capital perfectly fit to function as a tool for the facilitation of the exploitation of the least developed countries.

Though these countries constitute agencies of imperialism, this obviously does not preclude the emergence of limited or even intense conflict between these countries and the core imperialist countries as these various powers maneuver to advance their own positions, attempts by the core imperialist powers to seek to retain their power by throwing various countries back to semi-colonial existence, and the resultant return of great power conflicts posing the possibility of World War Three. Witness the U.S.-China trade war, a skirmish over semiconductor supremacy that belies deeper rivalries and the gearing up of the United States for war against its great power rivals, or the sanctions regime throttling Russia's Eurasian ambitions and the army of Western imperialism's proxy regime in Ukraine. Such frictions, however, are inevitable results of the division of the world into nation-states, and do not imply any counter-argument against the fundamental nature of the previously identified countries involved. The weak imperialist powers remain tethered, as evidenced by their reliance on international finance.

The emergence of "weak-imperialisms" does not signify any progressive development in any countries of belated historical development, but rather an intensification of the lack of any "national independence" in the modern phase of imperialism: not only have such countries failed to establish any genuine independence from the core imperialists, but now they function to amplify the pressures of imperialism to other countries as well. The complete and genuine defeat of imperialism remains to this day the task of the global working class.

In their struggle to expand the markets for their own commodity and financial exports, the weak-imperialist powers can be seen laying physical and cultural groundwork in less developed countries for increased imperialist penetration of the rest of the world, eg. the various infrastructure projects launched by China in Africa, creating the conditions so attractive to the most developed powers for the export of advanced productive capital. At the same time, this behavior, more reminiscent of earlier stages of imperialism, clearly differentiates these countries from the most developed imperialist powers, who orient most of their investment towards other developed countries and countries of intermediate development containing the infrastructure suitable for the export of advanced productive capital. China's Belt and Road Initiative, ensnaring over 140 nations in debt traps totaling $385 billion by 2023, exemplifies this: ports in Djibouti and railways in Kenya become footholds for European and American capital, much as Portugal's enclaves once serviced British fleets. Similarly, Russian ventures in Central Asia secure pipelines, feeding global energy needs; Polish conglomerates in neighboring economies secure footholds for multinationals; Brazilian multinationals like Vale pioneer mining infrastructure in African nations such as Mozambique and Guinea, with over $5 billion invested since 2010 in rail and ports that lure Western capital; meanwhile, Poland's PKO BP's Ukrainian banking outposts ($500 million+ assets) embed financial tendrils, paving EU-domination. These are not acts of solidarity but the weak-imperialist modus operandi: pioneering penetration that ultimately facilitates the imperial core's exploitation.

Yet this assimilation exacts a toll. The weak-imperialist bourgeoisie, intoxicated by their gains, confronts decreasing growth, mounting class contradictions, nigh-impenetrable barriers to entry into the imperialist core and inter-state friction that threatens destruction unseen since World War Two. The workers and oppressed, bearing the brunt, stir: mass strikes in Chinese factories, strikes in Siberia...

Lenin's warning resonates: imperialism drags all into its web and the entire world towards barbarism unless checked by revolution. The weak-imperialist farce - far from heralding a "multipolarity" blessing - intensifies the global crisis of overaccumulation, which, colliding with the nation-state system, hastens the objective conditions for socialist transformation as well as explosive inter-state conflicts. The working class - spanning metropole and periphery and beyond - must forge unity against this hierarchy: not through nationalist illusions, but through the internationalist struggle to expropriate the expropriators.